

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
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13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/NE/DO		X		
18	D/NESA/DI		X		
19	NIO/NESA		X		
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SUSPENSE		19 Feb 86 <small>Date</small>			

Remarks

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Executive Secretary
19 Feb 86

Date

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Executive Registry	
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February 18, 1986

Senior Interagency Group. No. 50

TO: OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg
 NSC - Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel
 AID - Mr. Richard Meyer
 CIA - ✓
 DOD - COL David Brown
 JCS - MAJ Michael Emerson
 USIA - Mr. C. William LaSalle

25X1

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on Afghanistan
 February 19, 4:15 p.m.

In connection with the subject SIG meeting, attached are papers on Short-Term Humanitarian Assistance (agenda Item 4A), and Opening of Resistance Offices Overseas (agenda item 3A).

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Short-Term Humanitarian Assistance
2. Opening of Resistance Offices Overseas

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February 14, 1986

SUBJECT: Short-term Humanitarian Assistance for the Afghans

A program of short-term humanitarian assistance for the Afghans has been underway for over a year, designed to help sustain the Afghan population in place. For this purpose, a fund of \$8 million was assembled in late 1984 and '85 consisting of \$2 million designated by Congress for medical assistance and \$6 million from funds previously appropriated for other purposes.

Following discussions with Pakistan voluntary agencies, Congress and Afghan representatives, programs were conceived and implemented in the following categories:

A. Support of medical clinics inside Afghanistan and medical facilities which treat sick and wounded Afghans (\$2,509,000).

B. Medical training of Afghans to serve inside Afghanistan (\$1,495,000).

C. Cash-for-food for deficit areas inside Afghanistan (\$2,462,000).

D. An initial contribution for educational assistance inside Afghanistan (\$75,000).

As preparation for the longer-term humanitarian program, we also funded three project design efforts by AID contractors (\$302,000).

Attached is a budget summation of projects and expenditures thus far.

On the basis of reports received thus far, the short-term humanitarian program has achieved a number of important objectives:

-- Voluntary agencies (largely European) active inside Afghanistan have been fully funded.

-- The ICRC has maintained its first-aid stations along the frontier and its hospitals and training programs in

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Pakistan. These are the main sources of emergency medical assistance for wounded Afghans.

-- Through the provision of cash grants, sufficient food has been provided to Afghans in deficit areas to sustain the population through the winter. The voluntary agencies conducting the programs have done an excellent job of implementing the program and documenting their activities.

-- In part because of our participation in these various programs, voluntary agencies have been able to obtain substantial matching funds from European sources. In addition, several U.S. voluntary agencies have become active in important programs.

-- Major training programs in medical skills now are underway which should in the course of 1986-87 enable Afghans better to treat their own wounded.

Next Steps

There is approximately \$1.15 million left in the short-term program which must be spent by the end of May 1986. The inter-agency group managing the program will convene soon to discuss how best to use the remaining money. A notional budget for future expenditures follows:

-- Further support for medical clinics inside Afghanistan (\$650,000).

-- Cash-for-food for internally displaced Afghans (\$151,000).

-- Start-up funding for para - veterinary and agricultural training and assistance (\$356,000).

Note that the proposal foresees undertaking two additional activities, paravet and agriculture training. Both will involve participation by American voluntary agencies with good records in developing countries. The committee will also at several proposals to establish a voluntary agency research office to gather and analyze information on humanitarian conditions and needs inside Afghanistan.

Attachment:
As stated.

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CONFIDENTIALHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE AFGHANSBUDGET - AS OF FEBRUARY 14, 1986**I. Funds Committed**

A. Initial Medical Assistance	\$2,000,000
B. Food Assistance - first tranche -IRC AfghanAid, Guilde du Raid, AFRANE, and second tranche - IRC - AfghanAid	2,039,000
C. Medical Training - Americares/SA, AMI, SCA	270,000
D. Medical Training - IMC and FM	1,195,000
E. Ambulances - AfghanAid	120,000
F. Food and Medical Assistance - Americares/SCA	150,000
G. Medical Assistance - Americares/MDM	312,000
H. Education - Americares/AfEducCommittee	75,000
I. Project Design	302,000
sub-total	<u>\$6,463,000</u>

II. Funds to be Committed in Few Days

A. Food Assistance - second tranche cash-for-food IRC/Guilde du Raid	\$ 335,000
B. Medical Training/Americares/SA/AMI (grant increase for more field training)	30,000
C. Medical - Palm Beach Clinic	15,000
sub-total	<u>\$ 380,000</u>

III. Funds for Projects in Preparation

A. Food Assistance - second tranche cash-for-food IRC/AFRANE	151,000
B. Medical Assistance - second tranche Americares/MSF	150,000
C. Medical Assistance - second tranche Americares	100,000
D. Medical Assistance - Bonner Afghan Komitee	400,000
E. World Concern - paravets, livestock, agric	203,000
F. Mercy Corps - transport, medical clinics/trng	153,000
sub-total	<u>\$1,157,000</u>
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>\$8,000,000</u>

Funds Allocated by Activity

Food Assistance	\$2,613,000
Medical Assistance	3,039,000
Medical Training	1,495,000
Other Projects:	
(Ambulances, Education)	195,000
(start-up - Agric, Paravet, Livestock, etc.)	356,000
Project Design	302,000
<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>\$8,000,000</u>

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OPENING OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE OFFICES AROUND THE WORLD

1. Background

The alliance of Afghan resistance parties has had some successes over the nine months of its existence but needs offices around the world if it is to enhance its present, very limited international status. Offices would give the alliance bases from which to strengthen its position in regional and international organizations such as the OIC, the NAM, and eventually the UN itself. Also, the act of establishing and developing alliance offices would help bring the resistance parties closer together, and the experience alliance operatives would gain from running these offices would be invaluable. Most important, the existence of alliance offices would help build the resistance's image as a coherent and modern movement.

There are at least four obstacles which stand in the way of opening alliance offices. First, the Afghan leadership is in fact disunited, and without sustained pressure from Islamabad and other quarters, the parties are unlikely to be able to agree on permanent alliance representation abroad. Second, the Pakistanis are ambivalent about resistance unity. Their policies on the ground have tended to perpetuate divisions amongst the Afghans who the Pakistanis contend cannot be forced by outsiders to unite. The formation of the alliance last May reflected an evolution, rather than a reversal of the Pakistani position, and the new Prime Minister, like the martial law government, is keeping the offices idea "on hold." Third, the resistance parties are perennially short of funds for political action uses. To give alliance offices overseas any chance of success, they would need a regular source of operations funds. Fourth, the alliance would be hard pressed to find good people to staff what would in effect be a resistance diplomatic service.

2. Action Plan

Our immediate goal is the opening of offices in New York and Jeddah which, as the seats of the UN and the OIC, should have first priority. This limited effort may be easier to sell to the Pakistanis, will put less pressure on a fragile alliance, and will need less financial and personnel resources. Other long-term efforts will also begin.

Our medium-term goal should be to encourage establishment of resistance offices in key capitals in the Muslim world with a view to reinforcing Islamic support for the resistance. We suggest concentrating particularly on non-Arab influentials

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such as Senegal, Nigeria, Turkey, Bangladesh and Malaysia, in order to create a bloc of lobbyists who can help overcome some of the ambivalence of certain Arab countries to focus on "non-Arab" issues. With a strong diplomatic base in the Islamic world, the resistance could push for formal OCI membership, and subsequently move on to gain OAU endorsement as a prelude to a march on the UN.

We propose to take the following immediate steps:

A. Approach to the Pakistanis: Embassy Islamabad should continue to raise the issue whenever possible, our Mission to the UN should discuss it with the Pakistanis there, and high-level U.S. visitors to Islamabad should be thoroughly briefed so that they can bring it up with their Pakistani interlocutors. We intend to raise the matter up with Pakistani Foreign Ministry Additional Secretary Najmuddin Shaikh when he visits Washington later this month.

B. Approach to the resistance: Despite the Pakistani "hold" on the issue, Embassy and Consulate officials should continue to underscore the importance we attach to opening overseas resistance offices in the course of their continuing contacts with the alliance.

C. Approach to the Saudis: Embassy Riyadh should recommend that the Saudis ask the resistance leadership to merge the various resistance party offices in Jeddah (all seven parties are represented there) into a single alliance representation. The formal head of the office could rotate in the same way as the alliance spokesman in Islamabad.

D. Finances: Once the GOP agrees to the idea of opening offices, Embassy Islamabad should explore the question of finances with Pakistanis. Embassy Riyadh should discuss financing of the New York and Jeddah offices with the Saudi Government and the Muslim World League in Jeddah. The Embassy could also ask whether the Muslim World League would give office space to the alliance in New York as it did during the 40th UNGA.

E. Personnel: USIA should explore the possibility of offering English-language and more extensive diplomatic training to resistance operatives. Embassy Islamabad should approach the alliance both to describe what training we could offer and to ask the alliance for information on its needs. AID should assess the possibilities for aiding in the education of Afghan diplomats in the context of its Afghanistan program. Finally, Embassy Riyadh should ask whether Afghans would be acceptable as trainees in the OIC Secretariat and/or in Muslim World League offices.

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F. Making interim use of existing resistance offices: If it chose, the resistance could authorize some or all of the offices run by the various parties around the world to represent it in their present form until more representative alliance offices could be established. This procedure would presumably be agreeable to the Pakistanis. We will ask all NEA and selected other Embassies for updated information on Afghan resistance representation in their countries. Embassy Islamabad should discuss the idea with the Pakistanis, and if it is acceptable, we will examine ways of raising it with the alliance.

February 17, 1986, 0151B

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